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Abstract The EU enlargements of 2004 led to a redirection of Structural and
Cohesion Funds expenditures from EU-15 to new EU members as did those of 2007.
This redistribution of funds makes the accession countries even more attractive as a
location of FDI. Using a logistic regressions approach, this paper shows that a
reallocation of structural funds as outlined in Agenda (For a stronger and wider
union, COM(97) 2000 final, 2000) and successive revisions of the financial
perspectives for an enlarged union leads to a redistribution of FDI by approximately
4-8 percentage points from the current EU members to the accession countries
(2004 scenario) and 7-10 percentage points (2007 scenario), respectively.
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1 Introduction
The fifth and largest enlargement of the EU by ten countries took place on May 1,
2004. According to the Agenda 2000, the decisions by the European Council at the
Copenhagen meeting in December 2002 and the budgetary plans by the European
Commission for the enlarged Union for the period 2007–2013, this EU enlargement
has been financed mainly by a redirection of Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF)
expenditures from the EU-15 to the new EU member states. By preserving current
overall expenditure levels in the enlarged EU, the redistribution of SCF aims at
promoting the catching up process of the ten new members—eight of which are
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC)—and at closing the still
considerable gaps in infrastructure and capital endowments as a legacy of these
formerly planned economies. This redistribution of funds is expected to increase
foreign direct investment (FDI) into the accession countries in relative terms at the
expense of FDI into the EU-15 member states. The aim of this paper is to project the
magnitude of the redistribution of FDI from the old to the new EU member states.
The reallocation of SCF expenditures should affect the inward FDI position of
incumbent EU countries relative to the entrant economies. The theory of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) suggests that SCF expenditures may reduce the
plant set-up costs and, in this way, change the trade-off between exporting and
setting up foreign affiliates in favor of MNE activity (Breuss et al. 2001). On the
other hand, they may also improve the infrastructure of a country such as its
transportation network. The latter effect reduces transportation costs and favors
trade. The overall impact of SCF expenditures on the allocation of FDI remains an
empirical question, which is best analyzed in a logistic regressions framework,
accounting for spatial dependence. This approach allows analyzing the determinants
of a country’s share in FDI, originating from a ’typical’ parent country, as the
dependent variable. Further, one is able to explicitly account for external effects of
changes in SCF expenditures on FDI across borders. Finally, a spatial econometric
framework explicitly takes into account that investment decisions across host
markets for a given parent company are interdependent. With such a model it is
possible to simulate the hypothetical impact of a reallocation of SCF as formulated
in Agenda 2000 and the updated cost calculations of EU enlargement on the
distribution of FDI across old and new member countries in the past.1
We study two enlargement scenarios: the 2004 scenario with eight CEECs plus
Cyprus and Malta, and the 2007 scenario with the accession of Bulgaria and
Romania. Both scenarios take into account the financial agreements of the decisions
made by the European Council in December 2002 and the financial perspectives for
1 Note that, due to the publication lag in foreign direct investment statistics and the ongoing budgetary
period, it is only possible to investigate the corresponding response in FDI by means of simulations.
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the programming period 2007–2013. Based on these scenarios and a consistent and robust
estimate of the corresponding share-multiplier, we can then project the consequences
of the reallocation of SCF expenditures across old and new EU host countries.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reports the main features of
the structural policy reform in the EU. Section 3 draws on the MNE literature in
international economics and formulates the most important hypotheses concerning
the impact of SCF expenditures on the distribution of inward FDI. Section 4
introduces the logistic bilateral FDI regression framework, which accounts for
spatial dependence. Section 5 reports both the estimation and the simulation results.
The last section summarizes the main findings.
2 Agenda 2000 and structural policy reform in the EU
At their historic European Council meeting in Copenhagen on December 12–13,
2002, the heads of governments of the EU member countries, decided to enlarge the
EU by ten new countries (eight CEECs plus Cyprus and Malta). In July 1997, the
European Commission issued a communication ‘‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and
Wider Union’’, which dealt with the reform of the common agricultural policy, the
future of economic and social cohesion policy, the establishment of a pre-accession
strategy, the consequences of future enlargement and the financing of the
Community. The necessary reform of the EU institutions (Council, Commission,
European Parliament) in an enlarged union was laid out in the Nice Treaty, which
came into force on February 1, 2003.
The Agenda 2000 tried to strengthen Community policies and to provide a new
financial framework for the period 2000–2006 in view of the enlargement. It was
launched in 1999 and focused inter alia on the increase in the effectiveness of SCF
expenditures by a better thematic and geographic concentration of projects on
specific objectives and geographical areas; on the reduction of the number of
objectives from seven to three (Objective 1—regions with a per capita GDP below
75% EU-15 average; Objective 2—regions undergoing restructuring; Objective 3—
human resources) and on the adoption of a new financial framework for the period
2000–2006 in order to enable the European Union to cope with an enlargement by a
maximum of six countries within this period, while ensuring budgetary discipline.
Due to the changed date of both enlargements (2004, whereas the Agenda 2000
assumed the accession by 2002) and the number of entrants (not six but ten
countries), the European Commission issued a revised cost calculation for the period
2004–2006 in January 2002, which was accepted with a few adjustments by the
Copenhagen Council meeting in December 2002. Accordingly, EU enlargement by
ten new members led to additional financial burdens for the EU budget over the
period 2004–2006 by around 37 bn. euro (at 1999 prices) plus a special cash-flow
facility by over 3 bn. euro. The major part of the cost of enlargement was due to
structural actions (i.e., SCF expenditures). Two additional countries (Bulgaria and
Romania) joined the EU in 2007 and the ramifications of SCF expenditures across
all EU members for the budgeting period 2007–2013 are determined in the financial
perspectives for that period (see the European Commission 2004a). In principal, the
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financial perspectives for 2007–2013 aim at modernizing structural policy. The
funding proposals provide a total budget of 336.3 bn. euros, or 0.41% of EU gross
national income (0.46% before the transfers to instruments for rural development
and fisheries). Funding is spread across the three main objectives in the following
way (see European Commission 2004b):
(i) Convergence: 78% of the funding should be allocated to the new Objective 1,
to sustain growth and job creation in the poorest countries and regions. The
money should be channeled via the Cohesion Fund to countries with a national
GDP below 90% of the EU-25 average and via the Regional Development
Fund and the Social Fund to regions with a GDP\75% of the EU-25 average.
Four key areas are targeted: modernizing the economic structure; extending
and upgrading basic infrastructure and the protection of the environment;
enhancing human capital and tackling social exclusion (which benefits all
industries in a country simultaneously); improving administrative capacity.
(ii) Regional competitiveness and employment: the new Objective 2 replaced
Objectives 2 and 3 of the previous budgetary period and accounts for 18% of the
funding. It will ensure that the richer countries continue to receive structural
aid for education and training and combating social exclusion, support for
the knowledge society and innovation, protection of the environment and risk
prevention, and improved access to services of general economic interest.
(iii) European territorial cooperation: 4% of the funding is aimed at securing the
prolongation of the Interreg programs to encourage territorial cooperation.
The basic principles of financing the EU enlargement were already fixed at the
Berlin European Council. There, the heads of governments or states decided that
financing the EU enlargement must be realized without changing its own resources
ceiling of 1.27% of gross national income of the EU-15 between 2000 and 2006 and
of 1.24% of GNI of the EU-25 for the new financial period 2007–2013 (see
European Commission 2004a, p. 27). The additional costs of enlargement envisaged
in the financial perspective for 2000–2006 had to be covered by reducing transfers
to the EU-15 members—mainly in the area of Structural Funds Operations. To
maintain economic and social cohesion as one of the Union’s main objectives, the
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission of May 6, 1999 (OJ. No. C172/1, of June 18, 1999) on budgetary
discipline and improvement of the budget procedure for the 2000–2006 financial
perspective maintained the funding for economic and social cohesion at 0.46% of
the enlarged union’s GNP over the period 2000–2006 (as was already the case in the
period 1993–1999). Since the 0.46% ceiling covered 25 EU countries at the end of
the last programming period, the EU-15 economies were confronted with a
(relative) reduction as compared to the programming period 1993–1999.
In the 2004 enlargement scenario (ten new member states) the redistribution of
SCF transfers led to the largest reduction in the so-called cohesion countries.
Compared with 1995/96, Ireland and Portugal lost transfers by 1.5 percentage points
of GDP in 2004, whereas Greece and Spain only lost 0.3 percentage points. In
contrast, the new member states gained 1-2 percentage points of SCF transfers in
terms of their GDP (Slovenia 0.5 percentage points). In the 2007 enlargement
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scenario (Bulgaria and Romania) the redistribution will continue (see Table 3 for
details). From the other EU-15 member countries, only Belgium–Luxembourg,
Finland, the UK, Italy and Denmark face minor reductions in transfers out of the
SCF program of the EU.
3 Theoretical background
About two and a half decades ago, the international economics literature
successfully started to implement MNEs into the now standard, economies-of-
scale-based, new trade theory model. Since the early stage, researchers have
distinguished between vertical and horizontal MNE activity. Vertical MNEs are
characterized by the complete unbundling of skill-intensive headquarters services,
located in the skill-abundant parent country, and low-skill-intensive production in
the low-skilled labor-abundant host (Helpman 1984). These firms engage in trade
and export to consumers in their parent country. Horizontal MNEs also concentrate
their headquarters services in the skill-abundant parent country, but they avoid trade
costs by serving consumers locally in each market (Markusen 1984; Markusen
1995; Markusen and Venables 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2005).
At the beginning of the new century, these two types of models were integrated
into the so-called knowledge-capital model of MNEs, with horizontal and vertical
MNEs arising endogenously depending on factor endowments and the proximity-
concentration trade-off (Carr et al. 2001; Markusen 2002; Markusen and Maskus
2002). Whereas vertical MNEs come into existence, if differences in factor
endowments (hence, production cost) are large and trade costs are low, horizontal
MNEs most likely arise between skill-abundant economies of similar size and
relative factor endowments and at high trade costs. All these models share the
feature that a ceteris paribus decrease in fixed foreign plant set-up costs is associated
with more MNE activity.
The theoretical literature suggests including the following determinants in
empirical models of FDI and MNE activity. First both bilateral market size and
similarity in size between the parent and the host foster bilateral multinational activity
(see Markusen et. al. 1996; Markusen and Maskus 2001, 2002). Second, differences in
relative factor endowments stimulate vertical FDI. The parent to host country’s
physical capital to low-skilled labor ratio as well as the relative high-skilled to low-
skilled labor ratio should exert a positive impact on bilateral outward FDI. A relatively
better endowment with physical capital implies a comparative advantage in capital-
intensive activities (such as setting up plants abroad), and a better endowment with
skilled labor (human capital) represents a comparative advantage in inventing new
varieties and setting up firms irrespective of whether they are multinationals or
domestic ones (see Breuss et al. 2001; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2005, for more details).
Third, the knowledge-capital model of MNEs motivates interaction terms between the
relative skilled-to-unskilled endowment ratio with relative size and with trade costs
(Carr et al. 2001; Markusen and Maskus 2002; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). In this
way, it is possible to account for the differential impact of size and endowment
differences on horizontal and vertical MNE activity. We would expect a negative
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impact of trade costs on FDI only if vertical MNEs are dominant (i.e., at different
skilled-to-unskilled labor ratios between countries). An increase in the difference in
skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio in the parent and the host should exert a negative
impact on FDI, especially, if the parent is small (i.e., countries are of dissimilar size
given that the parent is smaller). A reduction of foreign plant set-up costs enables a
country to attract more FDI, while a reduction in trade costs discourages horizontal
FDI, but encourages vertical FDI.
Recently, these models have been extended to account for ‘‘hybrid’’ MNEs.
Specifically, the assumption of two countries has been relaxed in favor of three
economies (Yeaple 2003; Egger et al. 2004; Grossman et al. 2006; Ekholm et al.
2007). In a world of more than two countries, new possibilities arise for modelling
MNEs. ‘‘Hybrid’’ MNEs produce locally, but also engage in trade in one or the other
way. One important type of activity associated with ‘‘hybrid’’ MNEs is export-
platform FDI, where a third market is served through exports in final goods from a
foreign affiliate (Helpman et al. 2004; Baltagi et al. 2007; Ekholm et al. 2007). A
second important type is one, where each of the MNEs’ affiliates produces an
intermediate good which serves this MNEs’ production in all affiliates. In this case,
intermediate goods are shipped to all plants of the MNE (Grossman et al. 2006).
With pure horizontal or vertical FDI, bilateral and third-country FDI from a given
parent are substitutive with respect to bilateral changes in foreign investment costs.
If foreign plant set-up costs in Host A rise, FDI to Host B rises at the expense of FDI
to A (competition effect). Also ‘‘hybrid’’ MNEs are negatively affected by an
increase in additional foreign plant set-up costs in the foreign market where they
produce. However, in addition to the general equilibrium effects associated with
purely horizontal or vertical firms, changes in investment costs in a particular host
under ‘‘hybrid’’ MNEs generate direct third-country effects. An increase in
investment costs in Host A may exert two different kinds of positive effects on FDI
to Host B (externality effect). First, without intra-firm trade in intermediate goods
and given the resource constraint of the parent country and the level of investment
costs in Host B, the parent economy will partly reallocate its FDI from A to B to
fully employ its resources (this general equilibrium effect also arises with pure
horizontal and vertical MNEs). Second, if MNEs fragment their production across
borders within the firm and engage in intra-firm intermediate goods trade (Grossman
et al. 2006), an additional dependency arises. For instance, assume that MNEs
assemble their final goods in the parent economy, where also research is undertaken.
Let them produce one down-stream component in A, entering a further production
stage in B. With vertical intra-firm integration across borders changes in investment
costs in a particular host, say A, will affect FDI in another host in the same way. If
vertical integration involves trade in visible components, the complementarity
among host markets with respect to changes in bilateral foreign plant set-up costs
will decrease in bilateral trade costs and, hence, distance. See Baltagi et al. (2007)
for a theoretical and empirical treatment.
Structural expenditures are designed to stimulate infrastructure investments used
by all industries. We maintain that these investments are negatively correlated with
foreign plant set-up costs (see Kellenberg 2007, for a theoretical exposition). Then,
structural expenditures change the proximity-concentration trade-off and, thereby,
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the international allocation of FDI (see Breuss et al. 2001). Hence, an increase in
structural expenditures in a given European host increases FDI there. However,
under hybrid FDI other European economies might be affected as well. These third
country effects are positive, if vertical integration within firms is dominant. Then,
the strongest positive effects of infrastructure investments are likely to occur in the
given host and the closest economies. Given a positive correlation between trade
costs and distance, the positive impact on FDI to other countries should decline with
distance. However, also a negative effect is possible, if FDI into a country is
reduced by increasing FDI in third countries. This motivates host country SCF
expenditures and distance-weighted third-market SCF expenditures as two separate
determinants of a given parent’s FDI to a particular host.
All other third-market effects on bilateral FDI may be subsumed under the parent’s
distance-weighted FDI to third countries. Also for this variable we expect a
complementary relationship between bilateral and third-market FDI if hybrid vertical
FDI with intra-firm trade in intermediates is dominant. In this case, an increase in a
parent’s distance-weighted FDI to third countries will foster bilateral FDI.
4 A logistic bilateral FDI regression model
We set up a logistic regression model, which accounts for the impact of SCF
expenditures on the distribution of each home country’s stock of outward FDI among
the host countries.2 The overall aggregate level of outward FDI stocks of a sending
country and also its net FDI position remains unexplained in the logistic regression
approach. Further, spatial effects as motivated in the preceding section are accounted
for in three ways: (i) FDI into a country may be affected by the spatially weighted
average of SCF expenditures of the competing countries. (ii) FDI into the competing
countries enters as an endogenous spatially weighted average. Given the bilateral
explanatory variables, FDI in a particular host either decreases (competition effect) or
increases in the neighboring countries’ inward FDI. Since this variable is endogenous,
we apply a proper set of instruments as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998),
namely all explanatory variables with second and third order spatial lag. (iii) We also
test for the possibility of spatially correlated stochastic shocks.
We envisage a parent country i = 1, …, N, which allocates its stocks of FDI
measured in logs to EU-15 and new EU host countries j = 1, …, J at time
t = 1, …, T. Hence, we look at a ’typical’ OECD country and its allocation of real
outward FDI stocks among the EU-15 and the CEEC countries, disregarding other
alternative investment possibilities.3 For this, let us denote the corresponding log
bilateral real outward stocks of FDI by Oitj = log(Fitj), where Fitj is the share of
country i’s FDI stocks in country j in year t in all host countries in the sample
2 See Belderbos (1992) for a similar approach in a different context.
3 We use FDI stocks because flow data are too volatile. Also, in a fixed effects framework such as ours,
one exploits information from the change in data over time. Whereas the change in FDI stocks
corresponds to a net flow, hypotheses for the change in flows cannot be derived from the theoretical
models discussed above. For bilateral FDI data, the use of stocks and panel econometric methods is
highly recommended also by other authors (see Blonigen and Davies 2004).
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(including Spain). For convenience, we will stack the observations for each parent
country and year into the Jit 9 1 vector Oit. We will generally adhere to the
convention of denoting vectors and matrices by bold letters. For the logistic
transformation, we choose Spain as the home country base, because it reveals the
lowest number of missing values. Accordingly, let us denote i’s log stock of FDI in
Spain in that year by Oit,Spain = log(Fit,Spain), where Fit,Spain is the share of country
i’s outward FDI in year t in all covered host countries into Spain. Again, we may
generate a Jit 9 1 vector of observations with typical elements Oit,Spain for parent
country i and year t, Oit;Spain. Obviously, all elements of Oit;Spain are identical.
4 The
logistically transformed dependent variable is Oitj - Oit,Spain or, in vector form,
Oitj  Oit;Spain.5 The data are generally sorted first by home country (i) and time (t)
and then by hosts (j).
We are primarily interested in the role of three determinants of normalized FDI
shares, Oitj - Oit,Spain. First, we want to allow for ‘‘spaceyness’’ of FDI across host
countries as in Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007), but in a logistic
framework. Spaceyness across host countries relates to the interdependence of FDI
across host countries in a given year and is typically modeled as an inverse-distance-
weighted function of (real stocks of) bilateral FDI for the same parent country and
year in other host countries. Define eclnðdjkÞ as the inverse distance measure between
two countries j and k and wit;jk ¼ eclnðdjkÞ%=
PJit
k¼1 e
lnðdjkÞ as the so-called row-
normalized spatial weight given to host country k for host country j, parent country i
and year t. In the baseline estimates c takes the value of 1. To check the robustness
of the estimates, we alternatively assume c = 0.5 and c = 1.5. wit,jk is referred to as
a spatial weight since it is a function of (inverse) distance: the further k is away from
j the lower is the corresponding weight attributed to country k for j. wit,jk is called a
row-normalized spatial weight since
PJ
k¼1 wit;jk ¼ 1. wit,jk = 0 is generally assumed
for all j = k. Now, let us collect the elements wit,jk into the Jit 9 Jit matrix Wit.
Notice that Wit exhibits zero diagonal elements and all elements in a row sum up to
unity. Spaceyness of logistically transformed real stocks of FDI across host
countries may then be captured by the vector WitðOitj  Oit;SpainÞ whose jth element
is
PJ
k¼1½wit;jkðOitk  Oit;SpainÞ. WitðOitj  Oit;SpainÞ is employed as an endogenous
right-hand-side variable in our empirical model. If the corresponding parameter
estimate is positive (it has to be smaller than unity in absolute value for consistency),
we may conclude that there are positive spillovers on FDI in a particular host country
from FDI by the same parent economy and in the same year to adjacent host countries.
The two regressors of primary interest here relate to direct effects and to spillover
effects from SCF expenditures in host countries on FDI, there. Let us denote host
country j’s SCF expenditure to GDP ratio in year t by stj, and let us refer to Spain’s
ratio by st,Spain. Analogous to Oit, we can collect units of stj and st,Spain parent
country i and year t into Jit 9 1 vectors to obtain the logistically transformed
regressor ðsit  sit;SpainÞ. The parameter of ðsit  sit;SpainÞ captures direct effects of
4 If Oit,Spain were missing in a particular year, all observations of the logistically transformed variable
would be lost for this parent country and year. Principally, any home country can serve as the base, since
the logistic transformation is invariant in this respect.
5 Of course, the regressions below exclude Spain both as a parent and as a host country in every year,
since Oit,Spain is zero. Nevertheless, Spain is and has to be part of the simulations conducted later on.
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structural expenditures on the allocation of real FDI stocks for the typical parent
country and year. Spillover effects of SCF expenditures across host countries
may then be captured by Witðsit  sit;SpainÞ, whose typical elements arePJ
k¼1½wit; jkðstk  st;SpainÞ. A positive parameter of the latter would suggest that
there are positive spillovers from SCF expenditures in adjacent countries on FDI by
parent country i in host j and year t.
In line with previous research, we include a number of further control variables
which are similarly constructed. For instance, we employ two variables which reflect
the joint and relative sizes of markets i and j in year t (see Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004;
Baltagi et al. 2007). In particular, Gitj is the log of the bilateral sum of real GDP of
countries i and j in year t, and Sitj denotes the log of the bilateral similarity index in
terms of real GDP with log(0) B Sitj B log(0.5) (see Helpman 1987). Using the same
normalization and notation as before, the two corresponding logistically transformed
regressors are (Gitj - Git,Spain) and (Sitj - Sit,Spain) or, in vector form, ðGitj
Git;SpainÞ and ðSitj  Sit;SpainÞ, respectively. Then, we include a regressor referred to as
(kitj - kit,Spain) or, in vector form ðkitj  kit;SpainÞ, which reflects the role of
differences in capital labor ratios between parent i and the host countries in a given
year t. Notice that kitj is defined as the absolute difference between log parent country
i’s real per capita income in year t and log host country j’s real per capita income in
that year (see Helpman 1987; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004), and similarly for kit,Spain.
Furthermore, we include three variables capturing the general investment and
political climate across host countries. In particular, we include a regressor (Rtj -
Rt,Spain) which is based on the investment risk indicator contained in the International
Country Risk Guide.6 A higher index value Rtj reflects a greater investment risk in
country j and year t. Then, we employ the Polity IV index as available from the Polity
IV Project through (Ptj - Pt,Spain) as a measure of the political climate in a country.
A higher index value of Ptj reflects a better political climate in country j and year t.
Moreover, we use regime durability from the Polity IV Project through (Dtj - Dt,Spain)
to allow for a specific impact of political stability (irrespective of other elements of the
political climate). A larger index value of Dtj implies that the political regime is
already in place for a longer time in host country j and year t. Again, the corresponding
variables may be written in vector form for parent country i and year t as
ðRitj  Rit;SpainÞ, ðPitj  Pit;SpainÞ, and ðDitj  Dit;SpainÞ, respectively.7
Finally, we employ fixed time effects kt and fixed country-pair effects lij.
Whereas the former capture effects on bilateral real FDI relative to Spain which are
common to all country pairs (e.g., common cycle effects), the latter capture
unobserved, time-invariant influences on bilateral FDI stocks (e.g., distance,
common language, common borders, etc.). The inclusion of fixed country-pair and
time effects implies that we analyze deviations from the corresponding means,
similar to first-difference analysis. In this panel econometric setting, we are able to
6 Admittedly, there are other measures of the investment climate such as financial liberalization. To
address this point, we replace (Rtj - Rt,Spain) by a variable (mtj - mt,Spain) in the sensitivity analysis,
where mtj reflects the share of stocks traded as a fraction of GDP. A higher value of mtj should then be
interpreted as to reflect a greater degree of liberalization of the stock market in country j and year t.
7 In analogy, we may refer to the financial market liberalization employed in the sensitivity analysis in
vector form by ðmitj  mit;SpainÞ.
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control for a large variety of observed and unobserved influences so that the effects
credited to SCF expenditures are unlikely to pick up other unobserved effects.
Descriptive statistics of the (logistically transformed) dependent and independent
variables are summarized in Table 1. Notice that Spain is a relatively important
recipient of FDI by the average parent country and in the average year. Therefore,
the average value of Oitj - Oit,Spain and of
PJ
k¼1½wit;jkðOitk  Oit;SpainÞ is negative.
Similar arguments apply for (Gitj - Git,Spain) and (Sitj - Sit,Spain): Spain is relatively
large so that the average parent-plus-host country size is smaller than that of the
average parent country plus Spain; since the average parent country is economically
larger than the average host country, it is also more similar to Spain than to other
host countries in the sample. Spain is a major recipient of SCF expenditures, and
this is why stj - st,Spain is negative on average. Notice that Witðsit  sit;SpainÞ
averages stj - st,Spain for each host country so that it is not surprising that neither the
average nor even the maximum value of
PJ
k¼1½wit; jkðstk  st;SpainÞ is positive. We
suppress a discussion of further descriptive statistics here for brevity. Details on the
data sources are given in the Appendix.
The corresponding empirical model reads
Oit  Oit;Spain ¼ b0 þ q1WitðOit  Oit;SpainÞ
þ b1 sit  sit;Spain
 þ q2Wit sit  sit;Spain
 
þ b2 Git  Git;Spain
 þ b3 Sit  Sit;Spain
 þ b4 kit  kit;Spain
 
þ b5 Rit  Rit;Spain
 þ b6 Pit  Pit;Spain
 
þ b7 Dit  Dit;Spain
 þ uit ð1Þ
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Log real FDI stocks: (Oit-Oit,Spain) -0.83 2.49 -8.59 5.54
Inverse-distance-weighted log FDI:
Wit(Oit-Oit,Spain)
-0.80 1.50 -4.43 3.16
Structural funds expenditures as a fraction of
GDP: (sit-sit,Spain)
-0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Inverse-distance-weighted structural funds
expenditures: Wit(st-sit,Spain)
-0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00
Log sum of bilateral real GDP: (Git-Git,Spaini) -0.31 0.63 -1.87 1.19
Log similarity in real bilateral GDP:
(Sit-Sit,Spain)
-0.88 1.03 -4.20 0.77
Absolute difference in log parent-to-host
capital-labor ratios: (kit-kit,Spain)
0.24 0.88 -0.79 2.52
Investment risk: (Rit-Rit,Spain) -0.84 1.46 -5.05 5.13
Political climate: (Pit-Pit,Spain) -0.43 0.71 -5.23 0.00
Political regime durability: (Dit-Dit,Spain) 22.23 33.34 -18.06 106.26
Financial market liberalization
(stocks traded in % of GDP): (mit-mit,Spain)
-92.73 72.71 -229.11 98.24
All figures are relative to Spain. The figures are based on 2,037 observations
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where uit is a Jit 9 1 vector of disturbances which is determined as
uit ¼ Iit  q3Witð Þ1eit. eit is a Jit 9 1 vector with elements eitj = lij ? kt ? m itj
where mitj is identically and independently distributed with zero mean and variance
r2m . The country-pair effects lij as well as the time effects kt are treated as fixed.
5 Estimation results
The panel covers outward FDI from a large set of OECD countries into the EU-15
and the CEECs over the period 1993 to 2003, and is unbalanced. Table 6 in the
Appendix provides information about the coverage of parent and host countries in
the sample, and Table 7 in the Appendix illustrates that the set of parent countries
covered accounts for the lion’s share of FDI stocks in the host countries and years at
stake. Altogether, we can exploit information from 2,037 observations in the
regression analysis, covering 246 bilateral relations.8
We estimate (1) using the GMM estimator proposed by Kelejian and Prucha
1998, 1999), which is computationally much less demanding than maximum
likelihood estimation (Anselin 1988) and applicable with fixed effects (see Mutl and
Pfaffermayr 2008). Table 2 presents the estimation results of the preferred
specification. Model 3 refers to the full spatial model, accounting for all three
types of spatial correlations (SCF expenditures, spatially lagged FDI shares, and a
spatially lagged error term), Model 2 restricts the spatial autocorrelation of the error
term to zero, while Model 1 only considers spatial dependence of SCF expenditures.
All three versions of the model in Table 2 fit well, and the parameter estimates are
relatively similar.
Based on the Moran I test on zero spatial correlation of the error term (Kelejian
and Prucha 2001) and on the t-test for q1 = 0, we reject Models 1 and 2 in favor of
Model 3. Hence, we concentrate our subsequent calculations and our interpretation
of the estimation results on Model 3. Notice that the role of country size in terms of
ðGit  Git;SpainÞ is negligible, which points to a relatively homogeneous pattern of
FDI across all country pairs within a year in the sample. Such common patterns are
captured by the time effects. The coefficients of ðSit  Sit;SpainÞ and ðkit  kit;SpainÞ
are negative and significantly different from zero as expected from models such as
the ones in Markusen (2002); see also Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus
(2002), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004). Among the other control variables, only
ðPit  Pit;SpainÞ enters in a statistically significant way, and the positive point
estimate of its parameter indicates that parent countries prefer investments in host
countries with a favorable political climate. Notice that we should not conclude
from the insignificant parameters of ðRit  Rit;SpainÞ and ðDit  Dit;SpainÞ that
investment risk and political regime durability are irrelevant for a parent country’s
allocation of FDI stocks across host countries. Yet, investment risk and regime
8 Notice that the potential number of country pairs with positive FDI relationships is 291. Of those, only
246 actually display an FDI relationship in at least one year. Hence, of the 3,201 possible observations,
495 are missing because there is no positive FDI stock in any of the years. Another 669 observations are
missing because there was no FDI at the beginning of the sample period.
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durability do not change enough over time and are too collinear with political
climate to discern their impact from the one of the latter variable and the ones of
fixed time effects and fixed country-pair effects. Fortunately, there is enough
variation in SCF expenditures to estimate their impact quite precisely. The latter is
partly due to the variation in the degree of exploitation of the allotted SCF.
We find a significant positive impact of both own and spatially weighted foreign
SCF expenditures on inward stocks of FDI. The latter implies that positive external
effects of SCF expenditures are at work. Also, the positive coefficient of spatially
lagged FDI indicates that direct investment in a particular European country is not
simply at the expense of inward FDI in the neighboring economies. That is, the
competition effect is outweighed by complementarity among the hosts as already
found in Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007) in different models. For
example, forward and backward linkages within MNEs across host countries, and
the exploitation of specialization gains due to cross-border fragmentation of
production could generate such an effect as mentioned in Sect. 3.
Table 3 reports the results from a sensitivity analysis, concerning the parameters
of interest. First, we estimate a parsimonious model, skipping all variables whose
parameter estimates exhibit a p-value below 15% (i.e., |t| [ 1.44) in Model 3 of
Table 2 (#2). Second, we use an alternative spatial weighting scheme setting the
decay parameter to c = 0.5 (#3) and c = 1.5 (#4), respectively. The former implies
a flatter spatial decay so that more distant third host countries matter relatively more
than in Table 2. The latter gives a lower weight to more distant host countries.
Finally, we use an alternative measure of financial liberalization, namely market
capitalization ðmitj  mit;SpainÞ as discussed in Footnote 6 instead of the investment
risk index ðRitj  Rit;SpainÞ employed in Table 2 (#5).
In general, the results are qualitatively robust across the experiments. For
instance, in none of the sensitivity checks (#2)-(#5) does the point estimate of any of
the variables of interest – WitðOit  Oit;SpainÞ, sit  sit;Spain
 
, and Wit sit  sit;Spain
 
– change its sign. Moreover, the point estimates for any of the three variables across
Table 3 Robustness of Eq. 3 results
Label Model Distance-weighted
log FDI
Distance-weighted
structural
expenditures
Structural
expenditures
Coeff. SD Coeff. SD Coeff. SD
#1 Basic model as reference 0.18 0.04*** 52.41 21.48** 14.50 8.15*
#2 Parsimonious model
(excl. variabes with |t| [ 1.44)
0.17 0.04*** 51.69 21.45** 13.80 8.12*
#3 Alternative spatial weighting
scheme, c = 0.5
0.19 0.04*** 32.52 14.92** 14.54 8.55*
#4 Alternative spatial weighting
scheme, c = 1.5
0.11 0.04*** 83.41 27.26*** 14.37 8.03*
#5 Financial market integration 0.09 0.06** 43.69 20.70*** 17.23 8.70*
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
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the sensitivity checks are too similar to each other to be statistically distinguishable,
given the estimated standard errors (i.e., the corresponding confidence intervals are
overlapping at conventional levels of significance).
From the results in Tables 3, we conclude that our findings appear robust enough
to use them for an evaluation of the consequences of SCF expenditures for the
reallocation of major parent countries’ FDI across EU member countries. Note that
while the econometric models applied here do not directly support an evaluation of
the consequences for the volume of FDI as such, they may be used to study the
consequences for the allocation of a given FDI stock into the EU-15 and the covered
new member countries, since the logistic model is designed to explain distributional
effects at a given volume.
To quantify the SCF expenditures’ impact on FDI shares, we use a simple
approximation, which is described in detail in the Appendix (see Hosmer and
Lemeshow (2000), for a model without spatial correlation). In the logistic model,
the impact depends positively on the FDI share a country initially holds9 (as long as
the FDI share is smaller than 50%), and on the spatial magnification effect as
captured by the parameter q1. As shown in Table 4, an increase in the SCF
expenditures to GDP ratio by 1 percentage point10 on average raises the FDI share
into EU-15 from all covered parent countries by 1.0 percentage point. However, the
marginal impact evaluated at the mean varies between 2.54 percentage points for the
Netherlands, which holds the largest FDI share in our data, and (approximately)
0.11 percentage points for Bulgaria with an initial FDI share of 0.07%. The overall
impact of the redistribution can only be inferred, when looking at the predicted
shares before and after a change in SCF expenditures. The reason is that we have to
include the external spatial effects of such a change, which are not fully reflected by
the reported estimates of the marginal effect.
Below, we use the parameter estimate of spatially weighted FDI (bq1 ¼ 0:18) and
the two estimated SCF parameters (bb1 ¼ 14:50; bq2 ¼ 52:41) of Model 3 in Table 2,
to undertake two thought experiments. The first one looks at the predicted effect of
the EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia11 in
2004 through its SCF-expenditure-related impact on FDI in the EU, assuming the
actual SCF expenditure distribution of 2004 (see Sect. 2). The second thought
experiment considers the effect of EU membership of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia,12 and the SCF
expenditure allocation corresponds to our 2007 projection for the programming
period 2007–2013. In both experiments, we set all other explanatory variables to
their 1995/96 average values without loss of generality so that we can isolate the
9 This is a well-known characteristic of logistic models, which ensures that the predicted shares are
restricted to the [0, 1] interval.
10 In many cases, this would imply that the structural funds to GDP ratio more than doubles.
11 We exclude the Baltic countries due to missing FDI data and Cyprus as well as Malta due to their
remote location.
12 Again, we exclude the Baltic countries due to missing FDI data and Cyprus as well as Malta due to
their remote location.
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impact of SCF expenditures on the allocation of FDI from other determinants of
FDI.
These thought experiments are subject to several qualifications. First, we use the
EU Commission’s forecasts on each country’s GDP and the (partly vague)
information on the volume of SCF (ceiling of 1.27% of EU GNP) to calculate the
expected distribution of SCF across the EU-15 and the new member countries.
Second, to obtain SCF expenditure figures (i.e., the exploitation of funds, which
inter alia depends on domestic cofinancing), we have to assume that, on average,
each member country exploits the available funds as in the years 1995/96, and the
new members of 2004 exhaust them as observed in 2004/06, while the new
members of 2007 will exhaust them as earlier members did in the past. Since we are
interested in a simulation experiment rather than a forecast per se, we use the
obtained figures to redistribute the SCF expenditures as of 1995/96 according to the
two scenarios and derive the implied counterfactual distributions of the real stocks
of outward FDI in this base period, without loss of generality.13 Consequently, the
results are widely independent of the overall volume (rather than the distribution) of
SCF expenditures and also of the remaining variables. The significance levels of the
projections are calculated by Monte Carlo simulations based on the estimated
parameters and variance-covariance matrix in Model 3.14 The results of the
simulation analysis are presented in Table 4. Note that almost all estimated effects
are significantly different from zero; i.e., a zero effect on FDI is not included in the
1-99% simulated confidence interval (***) or in the 5-95% simulated confidence
interval (**), respectively.
In the 2004 scenario the average SCF expenditure to GDP ratio in the EU-15
changes marginally as compared to 1995/96 (it declines by 0.31 percentage points),
but it increases from zero to roughly 1 percentage point in the average CEEC
accession country. This results in a redistribution of the 1995/96 stocks of outward
FDI by about 5.6 percentage points from the EU-15 to all seven CEEC accession
countries in Scenario I. Compared to the EU-15 as whole, the CEEC in 1995/96
only hold 4.5% of the inward FDI from the covered parent countries and, from their
point of view, this redistribution is quantitatively important. Although the
redistribution of SCF expenditures is mainly at the expense of Portugal and Ireland
in relative terms, it is Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium–Luxembourg that
face the strongest reductions in inward FDI in response to the change in SCF
expenditures. There are even countries with declining SCF to GDP ratios whose
inward FDI shares rise (e.g., Austria, Finland, Greece, or Italy). There are two
reasons for this outcome: (i) the complex reaction of FDI due to distance-weighted
cross-border spillover effects of SCF expenditures on FDI,15 and (ii) the property of
13 Notice that the choice of the base year for the simulations is of minor importance, here.
14 More precisely, we assume that these are the true parameters of the asymptotic distribution of the
empirical model.
15 Note that in a model with positive spatial externalities, there may be positive effects even in countries
that are not major receivers of structural funds. In the presence of spatial multiplier effects (in our case,
the significant positive impact of distance-weighted FDI), all explanatory variables exert a non-linear
effect with a spatial decay. Such spatial multiplier effects on FDI are also found by Baltagi et al. (2007)
and Blonigen et al. (2007), focusing on bilateral FDI of the US.
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the logistic model that larger countries react more sensitively to a change than
smaller ones (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), for a theoretical illustration of
the size-related impact of changing trade frictions in a pure trade model).
Accordingly, a country such as Great Britain loses FDI shares for three reasons.
First, its own SCF expenditures to GDP ratio declines. Second, the SCF
expenditures in the neighboring countries (Belgium–Luxembourg, France, Den-
mark, Ireland, and the Netherlands) decline. Third, it is a large economy and
therefore reacts more sensitively to a change in SCF expenditures than a small
country.
In contrast, a country such as Austria gains FDI shares in spite of its loss in the
SCF expenditures to GDP ratio, since in four of its neighbors in the sample
(Germany and three CEEC: the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic)
the SCF to GDP ratio rises. In this case, the external (spillover) effect of SCF
expenditures outweighs the negative own effect.
In the four covered accession economies of 2004, the positive impact of SCF
expenditures on FDI shares is relatively large. They gain a lot because of the rise in
their domestic and the adjacent CEEC economies’ SCF expenditures. However,
since their FDI share is relatively small in 1995/96, the marginal impact of structural
policy is also small as compared to the average EU country.16
In the 2007 scenario, the predicted effects on the FDI distribution are somewhat
stronger, since SCF expenditures are now shared by all seven accession countries
in our sample. Again, the impact on the average EU-15 economy’s SCF
expenditures to GDP ratio is about -0.35 percentage points. However, the average
CEEC’s ratio rises from zero (in 1995/96) to about 2 percentage points in this
counterfactual scenario. The result is a redistribution of the 1995/96 FDI stocks
from the EU-15 to the CEEC accession countries by about 7 percentage points.
For the same reasons as above, this is again mostly at the expense of Great
Britain’s, the Netherlands’, and Belgium–Luxembourg’s inward FDI stocks and
mostly in favor of Austria’s, Poland’s, Hungary’s, and the Czech Republic’s
inward FDI, although one also observes considerable gains of the remaining
accession countries. According to the simulation results, only 6 out of the 14 EU
economies (recall that Belgium–Luxembourg is treated as a single country) lose
FDI shares due to the structural policy reform planned for the 2007–2013
programming period.
From Table 3, we are aware of lower bound estimates of the two SCF
expenditure parameters (sensitivity analyses #2 and #3). Therefore, we additionally
report the changes in the share of inward FDI stocks associated with the parameter
estimates in Table 3. The latter is summarized in Table 5. The results do not change
much and estimated effects are very similar in size both to each other and to the
benchmark results in Table 4.
16 Accordingly, using data of, say 2002/03, we would infer a somewhat stronger positive effect on the
CEEC since their stocks of inward FDI were higher then than in 1995/96.
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6 Conclusions
According to Agenda 2000, the EU-enlargement leads to a reallocation of Structural
and Cohesion Funds. This follows from the consensus to preserve the current overall
expenditure levels and to finance the New Structural Operations in the Central and
Eastern European economies by a redistribution from the incumbent to the entrant
countries. Hence, it can be expected that the direct investments into Western Europe
and the CEEC are reallocated from the former to the latter, independent of whether
the overall volume rises or not.
Based on the knowledge-capital model of multinational firms and trade, this
paper formulates a bilateral FDI distribution model to estimate the impact of the
Structural and Cohesion Funds reallocation on the distribution of FDI from OECD
economies into the EU-15 and those CEEC economies that joined the EU in 2004 or
in 2007. Furthermore, we allow for neighborhood effects of Structural and Cohesion
Funds expenditures and for spatial autocorrelation in inward FDI stocks across
European host countries in general. Our estimates imply that an increase in the
Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditures to GDP ratio by 1 percentage point
raises the average country share in real stocks of FDI by 1.0 percentage points in the
average European economy.
We conduct two experiments of thought, which look at the hypothetical impact
of the Structural and Cohesion Funds reallocation as outlined in Agenda 2000 on
the FDI allocation in 1995/1996. The first experiment (the 2004 scenario)
considers the accession of four covered CEEC countries, namely Hungary, Poland,
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, predicting an increase in FDI shares in Central
and Eastern Europe altogether by about 5.5 percentage points. This is mostly at
the expense of FDI into Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium–Luxembourg and
France and in favor of FDI in Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.
In the second experiment (the 2007 scenario), which includes seven covered
accession countries, the effects are somewhat larger, raising the average CEEC’s
Structural Funds to GDP ratio from zero (in 1995/96) to about 2.0% and their
share in FDI stocks by about 7.0 percentage points as compared to the
corresponding 1995/96 share.
The simulations suggest the following general results. First, there are
pronounced cross-border spillover effects of Structural and Cohesion Funds
expenditures. Neighbors of Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditure losers
(such as Great Britain) tend to face a decline in inward FDI shares while
neighbors of winners (such as Austria) gain in FDI as well. Second, large
economies in terms of FDI shares (such as Great Britain or the Netherlands) react
more sensitively to changes in Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditures than
small ones (such as the CEEC).
Of course, our findings do not imply that Structural and Cohesion Funds
expenditures are the only important determinant of the FDI redistribution in Europe.
Other determinants such as growth in market size or convergence in factor prices
may well induce even bigger effects than those related to Structural and Cohesion
Funds expenditures. However, our tentative simulations illustrate that a ceteris
paribus change in these expenditures is likely to be of importance for the future
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enlargement-related change in the distribution of inward FDI among EU economies,
being of potential relevance for economic policy.
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Appendix
Data sources
We use the following data sources:
Outward Stocks of FDI: UNCTAD and Vienna Institute of Comparative Studies
(WIIW), in US $. We imputed missing values in the Unctad database using the
corresponding inward FDI stocks reported by UNCTAD and outward FDI into
the Eastern European countries provided by the WIIW-database.
Structural Funds: European Commission, in US $.
GDP, GDP Deflators and GDP per capita: World Bank, World Development
Indicators.
Investment risk: International Country Risk Guide.
Political climate, regime durability: Polity IV Project.
Financial market integration: Share of stocks traded in percent of GDP, World
Bank, World Development Indicators.
Real FDI stock figures are approximated in the following way. Similar to
previous studies, we assume that the available book values of foreign assets
approximate the depreciated nominal figures of outward stocks of FDI. We use the
GDP deflators to convert them to real figures.
Country and FDI coverage
Our analysis employs stocks of outward FDI from 15 European and non-European
parent countries into 21 economies, of which Spain serves as the base. Table 6
provides information about the composition of the sample with regard to parent and
host countries. All economies enter the sample from 1993 onwards. Yet, of the 291
possible bilateral relationships covered in the regressions (i.e., excluding Spain as a
host country), 45 are not used and display zero stocks of FDI throughout the sample
period.
Table 7 indicates the coverage of FDI stocks for all parent and host countries
across all years between 1993 and 2003. According to that table, the 15 parent
countries hold between 21 and about 84% of their outward stocks of FDI in the 22
host countries (including the reference host country Spain). FDI stocks from the
covered parent countries account for more than 84% and up to 99.5% of host
countries’ total inward stocks of FDI.
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The approximation of the impact of changes in the SCP-expenditures
on FDI shares
The approximated impact of a ceteris paribus change in the structural funds to GDP
ratio of country j, DSjt, on its own FDI share in all OECD economies’ outward FDI
into Europe in year t, Fitj, is given by the jth row of DFitb1 Iq1Witð Þ1Uit; where
the elements Uitj as defined as Fitj(1 - Fitj)Dstj. The external effect on country
k = j is given by the kth row of DFitq2 Iq1Witð Þ1WitUit. Here, we only consider
the case, where Dstk = 0, if k = j.
We calculate the predicted values of the basic and the counterfactual model as
follows. First, denote the true model prediction of Eq. 1 by Iit  q1Witð Þ1Zit,
where Iit is a Jit 9 Jit identity matrix. Then, let us denote the Jit 9 1 vector of
changes in the predictions of Oit  Oit;Spain due to a redistribution of structural funds
Table 6 Country coverage
All countries appear in the data
from 1993 onwards
Country Included as
Parent country Host country
Austria Yes Yes
Belgium–Luxembourg Yes Yes
Bulgaria No Yes
Canada Yes No
Czech Republic No Yes
Denmark Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes
France Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes
Great Britain Yes Yes
Greece No Yes
Hungary No Yes
Ireland No Yes
Italy Yes Yes
Japan Yes No
Netherlands Yes Yes
Norway Yes No
Poland No Yes
Portugal No Yes
Romania No Yes
Slovak Republic No Yes
Slovenia No Yes
Spain No Yes
Sweden Yes Yes
Switzerland Yes No
United States Yes No
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at time t only as DZit ¼ ðb1Iit þ q2WitÞ Dsit  DsSpainit
 
. In the following, we focus
on a typical parent country and skip the index of parent i for simplicity. Defining the
dependent variable ðOtj  Ot;SpainÞ ¼ log FtjFt;Spain
 
, j = 1, …, Jt, we have in matrix
form
Ot  Ot;Spain ¼ q1WtðOt  Ot;SpainÞ þ Zt
¼ It  q1Wtð Þ1Zt:
ð2Þ
Now, take the difference of Zt before and after the redistribution of structural funds
to obtain the Jt 9 1 vector
DðOt  Ot;SpainÞ ¼ It  q1Wtð Þ1DZt; ð3Þ
Table 7 Share of outward and
inward stocks of FDI in the
sample in countries’ total
outward and inward FDI stocks
(reported figures are averages
for 1993–2003 in percent)
Total stocks of outward and
inward FDI per country are from
UNCTAD’s World Investment
Reports for the years 1993–2006
Country Share of in-sample
outward FDI in total
outward FDI
Share of in-sample
inward FDI intotal
inward FDI
Austria 75.92 95.12
Belgium–Luxembourg 84.16 98.84
Bulgaria – 84.56
Canada 22.65 –
Czech Republic – 97.13
Denmark 58.14 97.35
Finland 71.14 97.32
France 58.08 98.57
Germany 50.07 94.97
Great Britain 49.36 91.20
Greece – 98.47
Hungary – 97.58
Ireland – 99.26
Italy 73.32 97.86
Japan 21.01 –
Netherlands 53.23 95.92
Norway 71.42 –
Poland – 95.98
Portugal – 87.00
Romania – 87.70
Slovak Republic – 89.64
Slovenia – 91.71
Spain – 95.13
Sweden 62.73 99.50
Switzerland 54.79 –
United States 46.73 –
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which has typical element D(Otj - Ot,Spain). Now, define the jth element of
It  q1Wtð Þ1Zt as eZtj to define Ftj ¼ e
eZtj
PJ
j¼1 e
eZtj
. Similarly, define the jth element of
It  q1Wtð Þ1DZt as D eZtj to obtain
O0tj  Otj ¼ log
F0tj
F0t;Spain
 log Ftj
Ft;Spain
¼ D eZtj )
F0tj
F0t;Spain
¼ Ftj
Ft;Spain
eD
eZtj
X
j6¼Spain
F0tj ¼
F0t;Spain
Ft;Spain
X
j 6¼Spain
Ftje
DeZtj ¼ 1  F0t;Spain )
F0t;Spain ¼
Ft;Spain
Ft;Spain þ
P
j6¼Spain FtjeD
eZtj
F0tj ¼
F0t;Spain
Ft;Spain
Ftje
DeZtj :
ð4Þ
Equations 2 and 4 are used to derive the counterfactual estimates in Tables 4 and 5.
Since the standard errors of this non-linear effect cannot be derived analytically, we
take the estimated preferred model as the true one and use Monte Carlo simulations
to assess the significance of the effects. For this, we use the point estimates of Model
3 in Table 4 as the unbiased means which are distributed according to the
corresponding estimated (asymptotically normal) variance-covariance matrix. We
randomly draw 10,000 coefficients from the multivariate normal with means bq1, bq2,
and bb1 and the variance-covariance matrix as estimated in Model 3 to produce the
significance levels in Table 4.
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